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The word trust has been applied to many different forms of
combination, which may be generally classified into three
kinds: (i) a partnership between corporations, (2) a corporation
controlling other corporations, and (3) a corporation buying out
all other corporations in its line of business. All these differ-
ent kinds of trusts, though of very recent origin, have been re-
peatedly before the Courts.
I.
CORPORATE PARTNERSHIPS.
The first-named kind of trust combination-a partnership be-
tween corporations-is the most common form, and it is the one
which has been most frequently passed upon by our Courts. It
probably originated in an attempt to induce competing manu-
facturers to agree on prices and terms of sale. Informal agree-
ments or understandings of this kind having proved too weak
to be efficacious, some astute brain devised the trust copart-
nership.
The modus ofierandi of such a combination may be illustrated
by reference to the articles of agreement of the Sugar Refin-
eries Company, popularly known as the Sugar Trust. This
combination comprised all the sugar refiners in the State of
New York, and, with a few exceptions, in the United States.
It rested upon a written agreement by which it was promised
that all the shares of the capital stock of all the combining
corporations should be transferred to a board consisting of
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eleven trustees, to be held by them subject to the purposes set
forth in the agreement. This board, which was named "the
Sugar Refineries Company," was authorized to make by-laws,
to appoint from among its members a president, vice-president,
treasurer and committees, and to prescribe their duties and
powers. It was to issue, and did issue, "trust certificates," to
be divided by the board among the several refineries in due
proportion to the values of their respective plants, for distribu-
tion among their stockholders in proportion to each stock-
holder's interest in the corporation. These certificates are in
the form of stock certificates, and have indorsed on them the
usual blank form of assignment and power of attorney, coupled
with a proviso to the effect that the assignee by accepting the
transfer assents to the terms of the trust agreement. Each cor-
poration in the combination is bound by a special provision in
the trust agreement to pay over to the trust board all the profits
arising from its business, and the agreement declares that the
aggregate of such profits, or such amounts as may be desig-
nated for dividends, shall be proportionately distributed by the
board, at such time as -it may determine, to the holders of the
trust certificates. The trust board was to transfer enough
shares of stock in each corporation to different individuals to
qualify them to become directors of the corporations. The
affairs of each corporation were to be managed by these puppet
directors, under the control and direction of the trust board.
The full text of this trust agreement is given in the Peopkle v.
tIe Norlh River Sugar Refining Co. (189o), 121 N. Y. 585.
It is also customary in each document to state the avowed
objects of the association; and it is noticeable that these state-
ments never mention the real object of the combination-
monopoly. On the other hand, they all give the innocent and
even philanthropic reasons for their action. Take for example
the statement of the American Cattle Trust:
"The general object contemplated by the parties who unite
in the establishment of this trust is to encourage, develop and
secure improved methods and economies in the production,
transportation, distribution, handling and sale of cattle, sheep,
hogs and other animals."
What could be more innocent than this? There is a little
more candor, however, in the statement of the American Pre-
servers Trust. The object of this combination was thus stated:
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" To consolidate the property and business, and to identify
the interests of the respective members of the association to
the end that they may secure an economical, profitable and
satisfactory conduct of the fruit-preserving business."
But the real object of such a trust may be stated more accu-
rately in the vigorous language of Judge Hallett, of Colorada,
who, in the case of Gould v. Head (1889), U. S. Circ. Ct., Dist.
Colo., 38 Fed. Repr. 886, speaking of the American Cattle
Trust, said :
"The stock was transferred to the trust, not for the purposes
of being sold, but to give control of the corporations, to make
the officers puppets in the hands of the trust, and thus substi-
tute the latter as the governing body of the corporations. In
other words, the purpose of the association was not to buy and
sell corporations in open market, but to manage and control
them."
And a committee of the New York Legislature, in its report
on the Sugar Trust, said:
"There has been an enormous speculation in the certificates
of the trust and certificates of deposit issued by the cen-
tral trust company in exchange for the trust certificates.
It was plainly one of the chief purposes of this trust to pro-
vide for the issue of these certificates, affording thereby an op-
portunity for great speculation in them, obviously to the ad-
vantage of the persons managing the trust, with whom was
lodged full and accurate information of its plans and condition,
but to the disadvantage of the general public, who were igno-
rant of the secrets of the trust, its methods and plans, and of
the actual value of the certificates in which they dealt. The
issue of $50,000,000 of certificates was amply sufficient for a
speculation of many hundreds of millions of dollars.
"It may well be questioned whether the trust was organized
more for the purpose of enormous speculations than for the ad-
vantages to be obtained by a combination of refineries in the
legitimate refining of sugar. That the chief object of the
trust was for the purpose of speculation is quite plainly
shown by the inflated values placed upon the property of the
constituent corporations upon which certificates were issued.
Had the aim been solely a more economical and profitable re-
fining of sugar, this result would have been obtained without
an increase of the capitalization of the properties of the con-
stituent corporations."
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These opinions, judicial and legislative, of the real objects
for which the trusts are formed, may account for the fact that
when these philanthropic associations, organized to " secure
improved methods and economies," have come into court they
have fared rather badly. They have been repeatedly declared
illegal. The objections to them are twofold: first, they violate
the law of corporations; secondly, they are contrary to public
policy.
That a combination like the Sugar Refineries Company is a
partnership can admit of no doubt. Bouvier defines a partner-
ship as:
"A relation founded upon a contract between two or more
persons to do business as individuals on joint indiidual
account."
That these elements are all found in the Sugar Refineries
Company and all similar associations is apparent on the very
face of their articles of association.
Now, the reason why a corporation cannot legally enter into
copartnership either with an individual or with another corpora-
tion is that it cannot lawfully give to its copartners the power
which by the law of partnership each partner possesses in regard
to the partnership property and over the rights of his copart-
ners, nor can it lawfully assume the liabilities imposed by law
upon the members of a copartnership. The very object of form-
ing a corporation for commercial or manufacturing purposes is
to escape the liability of a partnership, and the liability is es-
caped by restricting the powers of the members.
Thus, in a partnership, each partner is, within the scope of
the partnership business, the general agent of the firm. A
purchase or sale by one partner binds the others.1
A release by one partner is a release by all." And it may be
said in general that any one partner may do any act in regard
to the partnership business that could be done by all the part-
ners together.
On the other hand, it is a fundamental principle of the law
of corporations that the affairs of the corporation and the busi-
ness it carries on shall be managed by its directors, and by them
'Lamber's Case (1614), Godb. 244; Hyaitv. Hare (1619), Comb. 383.
2 Pierson v. Hooker (iSo8), 3 Johns. 68; Morse v. Bellows (1835), 7 N. H.
567; _Voyes v. New Haven,Xezv London and Stoning/on R. Co. (iS6i), 30
Conn. i.
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alone. Thus it was said by Judge Dickinson in the case of
Small v. ,Iinneaf/olis Electro iMfatrix Co., decided by the
Supreme Court of Minnesota, Jan. 6, 1891 :
"In the absence of express provisions to the contrary, it is to
be considered as the law concerning business corporations that
their affairs are to be managed in the interest of their stock-
holders, and by directors or agents appointed by them."
So strictly is this principle enforced that it has been held
that powers confided to the directors cannot be exercised even
by the stockholders who elect the directors and whose represen-
tatives the directors are.'
The directors, being agents, cannot, under the familiar rule
of agency, delegate their powers to others. .Delegalus non
polest delegare. Being trustees in whom personal confidence is
reposed, they cannot abdicate their functions so long as they
retain the trust.
Since, therefore, the rules of law governing corporations and
the rules of law governing partnership are so different that a
partnership composed of corporations cannot exist without
violating some of those rules, it follows as an inevitable conclu-
sion that such a partnership is illegal and therefore void. This
has been adjudged in a multitude of cases, and may now be
considered settled law throughout the United States.'
It is true that in the case of Allen v. Toonsocket Co. (1876),
I I R. I. 288, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that a cor-
poration might form with an individual a copartnership at will,
since such a partnership might be terminated at any moment by
either party, though the Court admits that if the partnership
had been for a definite period it might well be argued that the
corporation had no right to make such a contract. This case
seems at first blush opposed to all the other decisions on the
subject; and it is difficult to see the force of the distinction
attempted to be drawn in the opinion, since it is a well-recog-
nized principle of partnership law that any partnership may be
' Union Gold ining Co. v. Rocky M1"ountain Nat. Bank (IS 75), 2 Colo.
575.
"'People v. 2%-orth River SugarRef§ning Co. (i89o), 12 N.Y. 1582; ,ial-
toy v. Hanaur Oil Iorks (ISSS), 86 Tenn. 598; M1arine Bank v. Lrbton
io Gray 582; Aevw York 6" Sharon Canal Co. v. FAtlon Bank
(83), 7 Wend 412; American ficserv'ers Trnst v. Taylor .J1anqfic. Co.
(i891), U. S. Circ. Ct., Eastern Dist. 21o., 46 Fed. Repr. 152.
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dissolved by any one of the copartners at his pleasure, even
though the articles of copartnership provide that the partner-
ship shall continue for a specified time. But it is to be noticed
that the corporation referred to in this case had but one stock-
holder, so that there was no one else within the corporation to
be injured by his acts, and also that the corporation, whose busi-
ness could not be inferred from its name, had been created by
special act of the legislature, which did not specify what busi-
ness was to be carried on by the corporation, so that it was diffi-
cult if not impossible for the Court to determine what acts were
and what were not within its powers.
In the case of Butler v. American Toy Co. (1878), 46 Conn.
136, the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, while recog-
nizing the correctness of the proposition that a corporation
could not enter into a partnership unless expressly or impliedly
authorized to do so by its charter, held, by a divided Court
(two Judges out of five dissenting), that the particular corpora-
tion then before the Court was impliedly authorized by the act
of the legislature by which it was created to enter into the part-
nership in question. That was a case of a corporation created
for the purpose of carrying on the business of a firm, which
business had been heretofore conducted by such firm in copart-
nership with another firm. This purpose was recognized in
the act creating the corporation, and so the Court held that the
legislature had impliedly given the corporation power to con-
tinue the copartnership with such other firm. It will thus be
seen that these two decisions, when considered in connection
with the peculiar facts on which they were predicated, need
not be considered as opposed to the general rule above stated.
In an able and scholarly article in Political Science Quarterly
for December, 1888, Prof. Theodore W. Dwight argued that the
Sugar Trust was a lawful copartnership, because the corpora-
tions were the individual stockholders of the several sugar
companies. But since the publication of that article, the New
York Court of Appeals has expressly decided that the parties
to the combination, the copartners in the trust, were the corpo-
rations themselves, and not the individual stockholders of such
corporations. So that point may be considered settled: See
People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., supra.
The objection to this, as well as to the other species of trusts,
on the ground of public policy, will be discussed when we come
to consider the last species of trust.
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Ii.
STOCKHOLDING CORPORATIONS.
The second kind of trust corporation-a corporation which ac-
quires control of other corporations by purchasing their stock-
was devised in order to escape the objections made by the Courts
to the partnership trusts. A good illustration of this style of
trust is the Chicago Gas Trust Company. It was incorporated
under the General Corporation Law of Illinois,' which provides
as follows:
"Corporations may be formed in the manner provided by this
act, for any lawful purposes, except banking, insurance, real
estate, brokerage, the operation of railroads and the business of
loaning money.
"Corporations formed under this act shall be bodies corporate
and politic for the period for which they are organized; may
sue and be sued; may have a common seal, which they may
alter or renew at pleasure; may own, possess and enjoy so
much real and personal estate as shall be necessary for the
transaction of their business, and may sell and dispose of the
same when not required for the uses of the corporation. They
may borrow money at legal rates of interest, and pledge their
property, both real and personal, to secure the payment thereof,
and may have and exercise all the powers necessary and re-
quisite to carry into effect the objects for which they may be
formed."
The objects for which the Chicago Gas Trust Company was
organized were thus stated in the certificate of corporation:
"The object for which it is formed is to build, erect, pur-
chase, lease, establish, maintain, enlarge, extend, and operate
or demise works in the city of Chicago in the county of Cook
and State of Illinois, and in such other place or places in said
State of Illinois as said corporation may, by the vote of the
majority of its stockholders, elect, for the manufacture, supply,
sale and distribution of gas and electricity, or either, for the
furnishing of light, heat, fuel and power for any and all pur-
poses for which gas or electricity may now or hereafter be used;
and to purchase and hold or sell the capital stock, or purchase
or lease or operate the property, plant, good-will, rights and
franchises of any gas works or gas company or companies, or
I Rev. Ill., C. 32, I & 5.
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any electric company or electric companies in said city of Chi-
cago or else-where in said State as said corporation may by
vote of the majority of the stockholders elect; and to purchase,
hold, sell, operate, or anywise become interested in coal or other
properties productive of material necessary or useful in the
supply or manufacture of gas or other agency or medium of
light, heat, power or fuel; and to, sell, improve, enlarge, ex-
tend, maintain, operate and demise any and all property so
purchased or leased."
The company promptly proceeded to obtain control of the
four gas companies doing business in the city of Chicago by
buying a controlling interest in the stock of each of them. Its
power to do this having been questioned by quo warrano, the
Supreme Court of Illinois held (i) that the company could not
lawfully exercise the power to purchase and hold the stock of
other gas companies as incidental to the main purpose of main-
taining and operating works for the manufacture and sale of
gas; and (2) that the power to purchase and hold such stock
could not be assumed by the company as its main purpose,
since such an object, as tending to create a monopoly, was not a
"lawful purpose" within the meaning of the statute.1
Judge Magruder, in delivering the opinion in this case, used
the following language:
"Of what avail is it that any number of gas companies may
be formed under the General Incorporation Law, if a giant trust
company can be clothed with the power of buying up and
holding the stock and property of such companies, and, through
the control thereby attained, can direct all their operations and
weld them into one huge combination? The several privi-
leges or franchises intended to be exercised by a number of
companies are thus vested exclusively in a single corporation.
To create one corporation for the express purpose of enabling
it to control all the corporations engaged in certain kinds of
business, and particularly a business of a public character, is
not only opposed to the public policy of the State, but is in
contravention of the spirit, if not the letter, of the Constitution.
That the exercise of the power attempted to be conferred upon
the appellee company must result in the creation of a monop-
oly results from the very nature of the power itself. If the
privilege of purchasing and holding all the shares of the stock
1 People ex rel. Feabody v. Chicago Trist Gas Co. (1889) , 30 Ill. 268.
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in all the gas companies of Chicago can be lawfully conferred
upon appellee under the General Incorporation Act, it can be
lawfully conferred upon any other corporation formed for the
purpose of buying and holding all the shares of stock of said
gas companies. The design of that act was that any number
of corporations might be organized to engage in the same busi-
ness, if it should be deemed desirable. But the business now
under consideration could hardly be exercised by two or three
corporations. Suppose that, after appellee had purchased and
become the holder of the majority of shares of stock of the
four companies in Chicago, another corporation had been or-
ganized with the same object in view-that is to say, for the
purpose of purchasing and holding a majority of the shares ot
the stock of the gas companies in Chicago, there being only
four of such companies-what would there be for the corpo-
ration last formed to do? It could not carry out the object of
its creation, because the stock it was formed to buy was already
owned by an existing corporation. Hence to grant to the
appellee the privilege of purchasing and holding the capital
stock of any gas company in Chicago is to grant to it a privi-
lege which is exclusive in its character. It is making use of
the General Incorporation Law to secure a special privilege, im-
munity, or franchise; it is obtaining a special charter under
the cover and through the machinery of that law, for a purpose
forbidden by the Constitution. To create one corporation that
it may destroy the energies of all other corporations of a given
kind and suck their life-blood out of them, is not a 'lawful
purpose.' "
The American decisions to the effect that, in the absence of
express legislative permission, a corporation cannot purchase
stock in other corporations are abundant and harmonious.'
A different rule, however, prevails in England, where the
later authorities allow a trading corporation to buy stock in
other companies without express legislative authority so to do;
and the English rule has been adopted in Maryland!
I Pzllei, Railway Co. . Lake Erie Iron Co. (ISSS), 46 Ohio St. 44;
Central Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. (i879), 31 N. J. Eq.
475; Franklin Bank v. Comnercial Bank (i88), 36 Ohio St. 354; .3/ill-
bank v. New York, Lake Erie &' IV. R. Co. (I882), 64 How. Pr. 20; Tat-
magev. Pel. (852), 7 N. Y. 328; 17fechanics' JIrnt. Say. Bank v. .ileriden
Agency Co. (i855), 24 Conn. 159; Berry v. Yates (1857), 24 Barb. 200;
Sumnner v. AMacy (i847), 3 Woodb. & M. io5.
2 Booth v. Robinson (1So), 55 Md. 433.
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If a corporation may buy some of the stock of another cor-
poration, it may buy a majority of it; if it buys a majority, it
may control the election of directors; if it controls the election,
it virtually controls the corporation. We would thus have the
anomaly of one corporation conducting the business of another
corporation. The objection made by Judge Finch in the case
of the People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., supra, to a
partnership trust would apply equally well to this case, that it
is an attempt to consolidate two corporations without comply-
ing with the statutory requirements through which alone such
a consolidation can be lawfully effected.
Of course the legislature might create a corporation author-
ized to buy and hold the stock'of other corporations, and such
a corporation might perhaps be organized under a general
statute where the language used was different from that of the
Illinois act above quoted. Thus, in Texas, under a statute
which provided that corporations might be formed for certain
purposes therein enumerated and also for any other purpose
intended for mutual profit or benefit not inconsistent with the
Constitution and laws of the State, it has been held that a cor-
poration might legally be formed for the purpose of dealing in
stocks.'
It is" to be noted, however, that the statute under which this
case was decided has been repealed, and that the present trend
of legislative action is toward limiting rather than enlarging
the powers of corporations.
III.
MONOPOLISTIC CORPORATIONS.
The third most specious form which the trust assumes, and
the one that is least open to legal objection, is that of a gigantic
corporation which purhases the property, machinery, stock in
trade and good-will of' all the corporations and firms engaged
in a particular line of business, paying therefor with its own
stock, and then operates or keeps idle the several factories so
purchased as its own property. A notable example of this
kind of trust is the Diamond Match Company, which was de-
clared illegal by the Supreme Court of Michigan, in the case of
1 National Bank ofjefferson v. Texas Investment Co. (1889), 74 Texas
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Richardson v. Buhl (1889), 77 Mich. 632. The decision, how-
ever, was rendered in a suit to which the corporation itself was
not a party.
The illegality which taints these corporations is one that ap-
plies equally to trusts of the first and second kind above de-
scribed, but which has not been before mentioned in order to
avoid needless repetition, -that they are contrary to public
policy because they create monopolies.'
It is a doctrine as old as the year books that contracts in re-
straint of trade are illegal; and the law's condemnation of
monopolies is of almost equal antiquity.2
Arranged logically, the argument read thus: A corporation
like the Diamond Match Company or the Chicago Gas Trust
Company tends to create a monopoly. A monopoly is in re-
straint of trade. Agreements in restraint of trade are contrary
to public policy. Therefore such a corporation cannot law-
fully be organized. This is the reasoning on which the Su-
preme Court of Michigan pronounced the Diamond Match Com-
pany illegal, and the, Supreme Court of Illinois dissolved the
Chicago Gas Trust.'
The New York Court of Appeals, in passing upon the validit
of the Sugar Trust, declined to decide the question of public
policy, preferring to rest their decision upon the inability o1
corporations to enter into copartnership; but the Supreme
Court of that State, in deciding the same case, fully considered
the question of public policy, and expressly decided that the
trust was illegal because it restrained trade in an unreasonable
manner, and inevitably tended to create a monopoly."
And it has been held in England that an agreement between
eighteen cotton-spinners, whereby they bound themselves to
carry on their respective mills for one year in conformity to the
directions of a majority of them, was void as an illegal restraint
of trade.'
This doctrine is, however, subject to the limitaion that it
I State v. Nebraska Distilling Co., decided by the Supreme Court of Ne-
braska, May 27, 1890.
2 Case of the ilfonopolies (i6o2), ix Coke 85.
3 See Richardson v. Buzhl, supra; and People v. Chicago Gas Trust Co.,
sufira.
.PeopNlev. Nortl RiverSugar Refining Co. (1889), 54 Hun. 354.
'Hillon v. Eckersley (x855), Ellis & B. 47.
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only applies to articles of necessity or of such general use that
the public is interested in their production. For a private
manufacturing company may, when public interests are not in-
volved, sell all its property to another corporation, receiving in
payment stocks of the latter corporation.'
'It is somewhat difficult to determine what are and what are
not articles of necessity; and the authorities on this point do
not furnish us with any general rule for answering the question.
It has been held that coal is an article of necessity within the
meaning of this rule: Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal
Co. (1871), 68 Pa. St. i73; and so is gas: Gibbs v. Baltimore
Gas Co. (1888), 130 U. S. 4o; and matches- Richardson v.
Buhl (1889), 77 Mich. 632; tnd lumber: Santa Clara Valley
Mfill and Lumber Co. v. Hayes (1888), 76 Cal. 387; and cotton-
bagging: India Bagging Association v. Koch (1859), 14 La.
Ann. 164; and butter: Chaplin v. Brown, decided by the Su-
preme Court of Iowa, June I, I89r ; and grain: Craft v.
MfcConoughy (1875), 79 Ill. 346; and salt: Central Ohio Salt
Co. v. Guthrie (188o), 35 Ohio St. 666; and also whiskey, at
least in Nebraska: State v. Nebraska Distilling Co., decided by
the Supreme Court of Nebraska, May 27, I89o . But washing-
machines are not such articles of necessity that an attempt to
monopolize the trade in them is illegal: Dolpfk v. Troy Laundry
Machinery Co. (1886), U. S. Circ. CL, Northern Dist., N. Y., 28
Fed. Repr. 553; nor are patent curtain fixtures: Central Shade
Roller Co. v. Cushman (x887), 143 Mass. 353; neither, it seems,
are sewing machines: Bi-Sool Sewing Mfachine Co., supra,
though all these articles are undoubtedly useful.
Another objection to this kind of trust is the inability of the
original corporations to sell out to it: State v. Nebraska Dis-
tilling Co., supra ; Small v. Mffinneapolis Elecdro Mfatrix Co.,
Bi-Spiool Sewing Vachine Co. v. Acme Aanief. Co., decided by the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Mar. 2, 1891; Treadwell v. Salis-
bury M17fanuf. Co. (1856), 7 Gray 4o4; Ardesco Oil Co. v. North Ain. Oil&
lining Co. (1870), 66 Pa. St. 375; Holmes and Griggs Mlan. Co. v.
Holmes &' Wessell Aetal Co., decided by the Court of Appeals of New
York, June 2, 1891.
2Fietsam v. Hay (1887), 122 Ill. 293; Aiiddlesex R. Co. v. Boston 6&
Chelsea R. Co. (1874), II5 Mass. 347; Thomas v. Railroad Co. (1879), 101
U. S. I; East Anglian R. R. Co. v. EasternT Counties R. R. Co. (i85I),
i1i C. B. 775; Troy & Boston R. Co. v. Boston Hoosac Tunnel & Wes.
Ry. Co. (1881), 86 N. Y. 107.
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svpra; for, in the absence of express legislative permission, a
corporation in whose business the public is interested has no
right to transfer all its property to another corporation. It
should either use its property and carry on its business as con-
templated by its charter or dissolve its corporate existence and
divide its property among those entitled thereto, or consolidate
in due legal form with other corporation, if such consolidation
is provided for by statute.
In the case of Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. St. Louis A. and
T. H. Railroad Co. (885), 11S U. S. 309, Mr. Justice Miller,
in delivering the opinion of the Court, says, after an exhaustive
review of the authorities, both English and American:
"We think it may be stated, as the just result of these cases
and on sound principle, that, unless specially authorized by its
charter or aided by some other legislative action, a railroad
company cannot, by lease or any other contract, turn over to
another company, for a long period of time, its road and all its
appurtenances, the use of its franchises and the exercise of its
powers, nor can any other railroad company without similar
authority make a contract to receive and operate such road,
franchises and property of the first corporation, and that such
a contract is not among the ordinary powers of a railroad com-
pany, and is not to be presumed from the usual grants of
powers in a railroad charter."
This language was quoted with approval in Oregon Railway
Co. v. Oregonian Railway Co. (1888), 130 U. S. 23; and the
doctrine therein laid down is also fully sustained by the follow-
ing cases :
A case which it seems impossible to reconcile with the decis-
ion above cited is that of Leathersv.Janney (1889), 41 La. Ann.
I 120. That was a case where three competing steamboat cor-
porations sold their vessels and all their property to a new cor-
poration, which proceeded to monopolize the carrying business
formerly carried on by the three companies. The sale was held
valid by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, though its avowed
object was to do away with competition. But as this decision
stands alone, and was made under a code founded on the civil
law, it can hardly be regarded as weakening the authority of
the multitude of cases which hold such a transaction to be
illegal.
If the reasoning of these cases is applicable to other corpora-
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tions than railroad companies (as seems to be implied by the
language of Judge Magruder in the case of Chicago Gas Light
Coke Co. v. People's Gas Light ' Coke Co. (887), 15i Ill. 530),
its logical result would be to make such an organization as the
Diamond Match Co. or the New York Biscuit Company illegal.
In the case of Central Transportalion Co. v. Pullman Palace
Car Co. (189), 139 U. S. 5o, Mr. Justice Gray, in applying this
rule to a corporation organized for the purpose of manufactur-
ing palace cars and transporting passengers therein, remarks that
the company was not an ordinary manufacturing corporation
such as might, like a partnership or an individual engaged in
manufactures, sell or lease all its property to another corpora-
tion. This language would seem to limit the rule laid down in
Pennslvania Railroad Co.v. St. Louis A. ' T. H. Railroad Co.,
sufira, to railroad companies or corporations akin to them.
More likely, however, Mr. Justice Gray refers merely to corpora-
tions engaged in manufacturing articles, which, not being arti-
cles of necessity, do not concern the public, since the rule in
question has been applied to a distilling company by the Su-
preme Court of Nebraska in the case of Stale v. Nebraska Dis-
tilling Co., supra, in which the Court says:
"A corporation can exercise no powers except such as are
granted to it by the charter under which it exists. It is no
part of the powers of the distilling company to sell all its prop-
erty, real and personal, together with the franchises and powers
necessary to properly carry on the business. The fact that the
corporation has authority to put an end to its existence by a
vote of a majority of its stockholders, in which event it may
proceed to settle up its affairs, dispose of its property, and
divide its capital stock, and surrender its charter to the State,
does not authorize it to terminate its existence by a sale and
disposal of all its property and rights."
And in the case of Small v. Minneapolis Electro Matrix Co.,
sira, the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in discussing the power
of a manufacturing corporation to lease all its property and
rights for the term of twenty-five years, said:
"We need not inquire how far, or under what circumstances,
consideration of public policy and of the general interests of
the State may affect the right of a corporation to discontinue
the business for which it was created and to surrender to another
corporation its property and the conduct of its business. We do
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decide that such a surrender of the property, and, so far as pos-
sible, of the functions, of a corporation, in order that, while it
is still to continue in existence, its business may be carried on
by another corporation to which transfer is made, would violate
the rights of a non-assenting stockholder arising from the con-
tract implied, if not expressed, in the creation of such an or-
ganization."
In leaving this branch of the subject, it is to be remembered
that the illegality of such a corporation as the Diamond Match
Company has never been judicially declared in a direct proceed-
ing to forfeit its charter, and that it is always difficult to predict
what the decision of a Court will be. From an examination of
the authorities quoted, it may be inferred that such a corpora-
tion, when operations clearly tend to create a monopoly in an
article of such general use as to be deemed one of the necessities
of life, is illegal, and will be so declared. But the question
has not yet been authoritatively settled.
IV.
Conceading the invalidity of trust combinations, it remains
to consider briefly some of the consequences of attempting to
form such a combination, and the rights of the different parties
in interest.
That the State has an interest in the matter seems clear from
the previous discussion of the subject, since the chief objection
to these trusts in all their Protean forms is the fact that they
are opposed to public policy. The offenders are corporations,
the offence is capital, and the punishment death. Both the
trust itself when it is incorporated and the corporations that
have entered into it are subject, at the suit of the State, to for-
feiture of their franchises, which Blackstone calls the civil
death of a corporation. This point has been expressly de-
cided.'
In many cases, however, the controversy has been carried on
not by the State, but by stockholders in the corporations forming
the trust. That such stockholders have an interest in the
transaction is obvious; and when they have not assented to the
illegal act, and, being in the minority, have been unable to
I People v. North River Refining Co., supra; Slate v. Nebraska Distill-
ing Co., supra; People v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., suapra.
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control the corporate action, they are entitled to an injunction
restraining the formation of the trust.'
The rights of the corporations forming a trust are governed
by two well-known rules of law-first, that an illegal contract
is not enforceable at law; and second, that the executed dealings
of corporations, even when ultra vires, should, when good faith
requires it, be allowed to stand. Thus neither a corporation
which is a member of a trust combination nor its receiver can
recover by suit its share of the profits of the business, since
such a suit would be an attempt to enforce an illegal agree-
ment;' though a receiver of the trust itself may sue to recover
debts due to the trust, since he represents the creditors as well
as the certificate-holders; and the corporations themselves are
stopped to deny the validity of the combination.' And it logi-
cally follows that a corporation which has entered into a part-
nership cannot escape liability for firm debts by alleging the
invalidity of the partnership;4 though, as against its copartners,
a corporation which has entered into an invalid trust partner-
ship may rescind the agreement and obtain restitution of its
property even after the agreement has been partly executed;
and a Court of equity will not enjoin it from violating the term
of the trust agreement.8
The rights of the holders of trust certificates have been con-
sidered in several cases in New York. It has been held that
after an unincorporated trust association has been declared
illegal, the trustees hold the assets of the trusts for the benefit
of the certificate-holders who have a right to have the property
and business placed in the hands of a receiver.7
It has also been held that where trust certificates are ex-
pressly made transferable on the books of the trust upon con-
dition that the holder or any transferree shall be subject to all
the provisions of the agreement creating the trust, a Court of
1 Small v. Afinn. Electro Mfatrix Co., supra; Cen. R. R. Co. v. Collins
(1889), 40 Ga. 582.
2 Gray v. Oxnard Bros. & Co. (i891), 59 Hun. 387.
3 Pittsburg Carbon Co. v. .Jfc.5illin (1889), 53 Hun. 67.
4 CatskillBank v. Gray (1851), 14 Barb. 479.
5 Mffolloy and Hanaur Oil Works (1888), 86 Tenn. 595.
6 American Preservers Trust v. Taylor 13fanuf. Co. (I89I), U. S.
Circ. Ct., Eastern Dist. Mo., 46 Fed. Repr. 152.
7 Cameron v. Ilavermeyer, decided by the Supreme Court of New
York, Special Term, Nov. i, I89o.
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equity will not compel the trustees to transfer the shares men-
tioned in such a certificate to the assignee of the certificate in
the absence of any proof as to the compliance with the re-
quirements of the trust agreement, even though it appears that
such trust certificates are bought and sold in open market like
corporate stock; 1 though it was said in Cameron v. Haver-
meyer, supra, that trust certificates are transferable without re-
gard to the regulations contained in the trust agreement, and
that the transfer has all the rights of an owner, even though
the certificates are not transferred to him on the books of the
trust.
Where the trust agreement gives the trustees power to ac-
quire hold and dispose of the title to the shares of stock
transferred to them by the members of the trust, they may sell
and transfer such stock to third persons:' but they cannot
sell or pledge such stock where the trust agreement merely
provides that the shares of stock shall be transferred to the
trustees to be held by them and their successors as joint tenants
for the purposes set out in the trust agreement. 3
Contracts between individuals in furtherance of the objects
and purposes of an invalid trust agreement, are not binding,
since the illegality of the main contract taints all its branches.'
V.
If the case of the Ontario Sall Co. v. the Merchants' Sall Co.
(1871), 18 Grant, Ch. 540, is an authority, the American rules of
law in regard to trxssts do not prevail in Canada. That was a
case where a large number of salt manufacturers, some of
whom were corporations, united under the name of the Cana-
dian Salt Association for the purpose of combined action and
mutual protection in their business. Their articles of agree-
ment provided for the appointment of trustees to carry out the
terms of the agreement, and each party agreed to sell the salt
manufactured by it through the trustees and to sell no salt to
anyone else.
The Court held (i) that the agreement did. not tend to create
a monopoly, since the parties to it, though numerous, did not
I Rice v. Rockefeller (1890), 56 Hun. 516.
2 Gould v. Head (I89O), U. S. Circ. Ct., Dist. Colo., 41 Fed. Repr. 240.
, People v. NVorlh River Sugar Refining Co. (1889), 54 Hun. 354.
4 Richardson v. Buhl, supra; Chaplin v. Brown, supra.
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nclude quite all of the salt manufacturers in the province; (2)
that it was not in undue restraint of trade, since the restraint
was reasonable, was only partial, and was based upon mutual
obligations which constituted a sufficient consideration; (3)
that though the agreement admittedly constituted a partner-
ship, yet its execution was not beyond the implied powers of
the corporations who had entered into it, and (4) that a Court
of equity would enjoin a breach of agreement.
It would be difficult to imagine a case which would more
flatly contradict all the precedents on the subject of trust com-
binations. Surely Ontario is the paradise of trusts.
VI.
Having thus considered the status of trust combinations at
common law, it may not be amiss to glance at some of the
recent legislation on the subject of trusts.
The Act of Congress, approved July 2, 189o (26 St. at Large,
p. 209, C. 647), declares illegal (i) every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States or with foreign
nations; (2) every attempt to monopolize any part of such
trade or commerce, and (3) every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or
commerce in the District of Columbia and in the Territories.
It provides punishment, by fine and imprisonment, for any vio-
lation of the act, and declares that property in transit under a
contract forbidden by the act shall be forfeited to the United
States. It also authorizes any person injured in his property
or business by any violation of the act to sue and recover
treble damages for such injury.
The Illinois Act, approved June ir, 1891 (Session Laws,
189i, p. 206), declares that any corporation, partnership or indi-
vidual which shall create or enter into any pool, trust, agree-
ment, combination, confederation or understanding to regulate
or fix the price of any article of merchandise or commodity, or
to fix or limit the amount or quantity of any article, com-
modity or mechandise to be manufactured, mined, produced or
sold in the State of Illinois, shall be adjudged guilty of con-
spiracy to defraud, and be subject to punishment by fine or
imprisonment. It also forbids corporations from issuing or
owning trust certificates, or from entering into any trust agree-
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ment with intent to limit or fix the price or lessen the produc-
tion and sale of any article of commerce. It declares void all
contracts or agreements in violation of the act, and provides
that any purchaser of any article or commodity from any in-
dividual, company, or corporation transacting business contrary
to any provision of the act shall not be liable for the price or,
paymnent of such article or commodity.
The Nebraska Act, approved March 29, 1889 (Session Laws,
1889, p. 516), makes it unlawful for any person, partnership,
company, association or corporation organized for any purpose
whatever, to enter into any contract or combination whereby
a common price shall be fixed for any article or product, or
whereby the manufacture or sale thereof shall be limited or in-
terfered with, or whereby the profits of the manufacture or sale
of any natural or manufactured product shall be made a com-
mon fund to be divided among the parties to the combination.
It imposes penalties of fine and imprisonment for violations of
the act, and provides for the recovery of damages by any per-
son injured thereby. It also declares a violation of the act
cause for forfeiting the charter of a corporation.
The New York Act, approved June 7, 189 o (Session Laws,
189o, p. io6, No. 7), provides that no stock corporation shall
combine with any other corporation for the prevention of
competition.
These acts are of such recent date that they have not yet
been construed by the Courts, but it will be seen that their
tendency is to emphasize and strengthen the provisions of the
common law, and to provide adequate penalties for their viola-
tion. The constitutionality of the Act of Congress, above
cited, has been affirmed in the case of the United States v. the
Jellic Mountain Coal and Coke Co., decided by the U. S. Circuit
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, June 4, r89r.
VII.
It will be thus seen that the illegality of trusts has been as-
serted by our Courts in no uncertain tones, and that our legis-
latures have been prompt in supplementing the unwritten law
by appropriate statutes. But though thus frowned upon by
the Courts and outlawed by the legislatures, trust combinations
continue to increase on every side, and they probably will con-
tinue so to do, as long as the profits to be realized from them
